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Open Access Article

Scientific Development Research . 2022; 2: (5) ; 1-4 ; DOI: 10.12208/j.sdr.20220142.

Reflections on the abuse of user data by platforms from the perspective of antitrust law
平台滥用用户数据的反垄断法思考

作者: 刘畅 *

浙江工商大学法学院 浙江杭州

*通讯作者: 刘畅,单位:浙江工商大学法学院 浙江杭州;

发布时间: 2022-09-20 总浏览量: 207

摘要

“数据池”共建广泛存在于平台型企业间,其具有促进创新、提升消费者福利等作用,应当对数据的共享保持乐观与包容的态度。但平台经营者对数据的搜集、使用亦可能存在侵犯用户权利、造成反竞争效果的风险。经营者在滥用用户数据的基础上共建“数据池”,并利用“数据池”达成垄断协议或利用算法共谋等形式进行“协同”。因其形式较隐蔽,对传统反垄断执法提出新要求。故在原有反垄断分析框架内,进行不同的因素分析,着重分析竞争关系、数据种类、算法共谋等因素,并针对相关因素选择规制路径。

关键词: 平台经济;反垄断法;用户利益;竞争风险

Abstract

The co construction of "data pool" widely exists among platform enterprises. It can promote innovation and improve consumer welfare, and should maintain an optimistic and inclusive attitude towards data sharing. However, the collection and use of data by platform operators may also have the risk of infringing user rights and causing anti competitive effects. Operators build a "data pool" on the basis of abusing user data, and use the "data pool" to reach monopoly agreements or use algorithmic collusion to "collaborate". Because of its covert form, it puts forward new requirements for traditional anti-monopoly law enforcement. Therefore, within the original anti-monopoly analysis framework, different factors are analyzed, focusing on the analysis of competition relations, data types, algorithm collusion and other factors, and the regulatory path is selected according to relevant factors.

Key words: Platform economy; Anti-monopoly law; User interests; Competition risk

参考文献 References

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引用本文

刘畅, 平台滥用用户数据的反垄断法思考[J]. 科学发展研究, 2022; 2: (5) : 1-4.